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  Health insurance has previously been shown to be an important determinant of retirement 
timing among older Americans. While previous literature has largely ignored the inter-spousal 
dependence of health insurance benefits, this study examines the relationship of both spouses’ 
health insurance options to the household’s timing of the husband’s retirement. Using data from 
the Health and Retirement Study, I find that a wife’s health insurance options have an 
independent impact on the timing of her husband’s exit from the labor force. This impact is not 
distinguishable in magnitude to that of a husband’s own health insurance options. Differences for 
each spouse do arise when each spouse’s health is interacted with his or her health insurance 
options following a husband’s retirement. The impact of a wife’s health insurance needs on the 
timing of a husband’s retirement is dependent on her health while the impact of the husband’s 
insurance options is seemingly unrelated to his health. The omission of inter-spousal health 
insurance dependency may lead to an underestimation of the cost and the employment response 
to changes in the health insurance system from newly legislated health care reform. 
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Research on the role of employer provided health insurance (EPHI) and retiree health in-
surance (RHI) in labor force participation decisions has been quite extensive over the past
ﬁfteen years. Much of this research has focused only on oﬀers of EPHI from men’s employ-
ers. To the extent that the health insurance beneﬁts of wives are considered, it is usually
limited to whether EPHI from wives’ employers could cover husbands if the husbands retire.
The inter-spousal dependence on EPHI has not yet been fully considered despite the fact
that in most working couples, each spouse has health insurance through the same employer’s
plan since most group health plans are available to both spouses in a household.1 Unlike
most group health insurance plans that employers might oﬀer to their current and former
employees, the federal government’s health insurance program for older Americans, Medi-
care, requires that each spouse be of the minimum age (currently 65) to be eligible for this
beneﬁt. Based on the fact that wives are on average two to three years younger than their
husbands, the rules of Medicare imply that a large share of wives do not qualify for Medicare
at the same time as their husbands.2 By including only the health insurance conditions for
husbands, previous literature may be omitting any response by households to the wives’
health insurance concerns when the husband is Medicare eligible but the wife is not.3 This
paper looks to account for this inter-spousal health insurance dependence and to examine
the relative size of the inﬂuence of each spouse’s health insurance needs on the timing of
husbands’ retirements using extensive data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).4
1In near-retirement aged households where the husband is working and both spouses report employer
provided health insurance (EPHI), over 87 percent of spouses are on the same plan. Sixty-nine percent of
households have a plan through the husband’s employer and 18 percent through the wife’s. Percentages are
based on the author’s calculations using the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study.
2For a distribution of the gap in ages between spouses in the Health and Retirement Study, see Appendix
Figure 1.
3Appendix Section A presents a basic theoretical example of the problem facing the household and what
is missing from previous work on this topic.
4Though the HRS is the richest dataset for Americans in this age range currently available, the number
of respondents does not allow for a parallel analysis of the relationship of spousal health insurance and the
retirement of women due to the small share of women who receive health insurance from their own employers
and even fewer whose husbands also rely on that insurance.
2Under the current health care system in the United States, near retirement-aged Ameri-
cans face very high insurance premium rates and limitations of coverage if they do not have
employer provided health insurance from a current or former employer. The 2010 health
care overhaul legislation, the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act (PPACA), was
designed to address both the cost and availability to all Americans but especially those who
are nearing Medicare eligibility age. Lower cost health insurance alternatives could aﬀect
retirement timing and would therefore have ﬁscal implications in the United States. First,
retiring individuals are generally replaced by lower income employees which will negatively
eﬀect income tax revenue for the federal government. Second, the ﬁnancial outlook for the
Social Security program is closely linked to the expected rates that individuals move from
payers to receivers.5 In recent years, the full beneﬁt eligibility age of Social Security beneﬁts
has been increased to encourage delayed retirement. No similar changes have been made to
the Medicare qualiﬁcations, but this may change in the near future as the date of projected
insolvency of that program nears. The projected impact of the new health care legislation
could be substantially diﬀerent depending on whether the needs of younger spouses are con-
sidering. The legislations goal of making the private, non-group health insurance markets
more accessible and aﬀordable could have implications as households are given access to less
expensive alternatives to EPHI. Such changes, if successful, would have ﬁscal implications for
Social Security and general tax revenue that may be underestimated based on the methodol-
ogy of previous research, especially given the declining rate that employers are oﬀering RHI
to their potential retirees.
Previous research has consistently found a link between health insurance oﬀers by em-
ployers and various labor decisions, including retirement. Papers by Madrian (1994), Karoly
5Though Social Security beneﬁts are designed to have actuarially fair beneﬁt adjustments for those who
retire before or after the normal retirement age, Coile and Gruber (2001) found that there is a small beneﬁt
disincentive to working between the ages of 55 and 61 and a large beneﬁt penalty to working between the
ages of 65 and 69 for the median male worker. The only beneﬁt reductions for the median male worker that
were found to be actuarially fair were for those between 62 and 64 but even those where unfair to almost
half of individuals at age 62. Therefore, delays in retirement should improve the ﬁscal outlook of the Social
Security program.
3and Rogowski (1994), Gruber and Madrian (1995) and later, Blau and Gilleskie (2001) all
found a strong link between men’s RHI and their retirement hazard using reduced-form
analyses, but none tested the impact of possible changes to wives’ health insurance status
(see Gruber and Madrian (2002) for a thorough review of the literature and ﬁndings). Sim-
ilarly, a number of papers that use structural models to analyze retirement decisions have
all incorporated individuals’ health insurance, but not that of their spouses if they retire.6
Recent extensions in this literature examining the the frequency of “joint” or coordinated
retirement within dual-earning households by Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and Kapur and Ro-
gowski (2007) also do not account for the inﬂuence of spouses’ health insurance needs on
each individual’s decision to retire. 7
One previous study has addressed the eﬀect of inter-spousal health insurance dependency.
In trying to isolate the aﬀect of Medicare on mens’ retirement, Madrian and Beaulieu (1998)
use the diﬀerence in ages between spouses to proxy for diﬀerences in health insurance avail-
ability upon retirements. Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) found an increase in the retirement
hazard of 55 to 69 year old men with Medicare eligible wives compared to those whose wives
are not Medicare eligible. Because the Census data used in this study did not include health
insurance data, it was unable to identify the size of this inﬂuence or compare it to that of
the husband’s health insurance options because they cannot separately identify those who
are constrained by the Medicare qualiﬁcation age (i.e. those without RHI) and those who
are unconstrained. The wealth of detailed data in the HRS allows for the estimation of the
impact of cross-spouse health insurance dependency while also controlling for factors other
than age that may inﬂuence the decision to retire.
In the analysis that follows, I present evidence that a strong relationship exists between
wives’ health insurance needs and the timing of husbands’ retirements, even independently of
6Most prominently, the studies using structural models to identify the role of health insurance in the
decision to retire include Gustman and Steinmeier (1994), Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1994), Rust and
Phelan (1997), and French and Jones (2011).
7Kapur and Rogowski (2007) do ﬁnd that the propensity of simultaneous retirements more than doubles
if wives possess RHI, which suggests an important role for health insurance in the timing of retirement within
households.
4husbands’ own health insurance concerns. Consistent with previous research, I ﬁnd that the
retirement rate for husbands who would lose their health insurance source upon retirement
(regardless of whether their wives would as well) is six to nine percentage points lower than
for those who would not. Not examined in previous research is a similar decline of ﬁve
percentage points in the rate of husbands’ retirement in households where the wife, but not
the husband, would lose her current health insurance source without having an aﬀordable
alternative. These marginal eﬀects represent a 30 to 45 percent decline in retirement rates
and are not statistically diﬀerent from each other. Interestingly, the impact for the wife is
dependent on her self-reported health while that for the husband is not. Speciﬁcally, the
impact of health insurance concerns on a husband’s rate of retirement is signiﬁcantly negative
if the wife’s health is rated as poor but not if the husband’s health is similarly rated.
Section 2 discusses the health insurance options and current trends for near-retirement
married couples in the United States. Section 3 describes the Health and Retirement Study,
the sample used, and deﬁnitions of key elements for the analysis that follows. Section 4
discusses the general methodology used and addresses some concerns raised in previous
literature. Section 5 presents the main results and a summary of outcomes following a
husband’s retirement. Section 6 concludes.
2 Health Insurance and Retirement: Background
Health insurance provision for working age Americans is centered around EPHI. The majority
of workers receive health insurance from either their own or their spouses’ employers. When
Americans reach 65 years of age, they become eligible for the federal government’s health
insurance program, called Medicare, as long as they have worked ten years in a qualifying job
(which most do). As previously mentioned, one spouse becoming eligible for Medicare does
not mean that the other spouse is also eligible. Medicare is available prior to age 65 only for
those with qualifying disabilities. If workers choose to retire before they reach 65 years of
5age, they have a number possible outcomes. For some, their employers oﬀer to continue to
provide health insurance to retirees who have worked for the employer for a certain number
of years. I refer to this as an oﬀer of retiree health insurance (RHI). The level of premium
subsidization depends on the employer’s speciﬁc beneﬁts but, in general, these programs are
retirees’ least expensive option due to the risk pooling over all of an employer’s employees.
Under most RHI plans, spouses of retirees can also be covered, though again, with diﬀerent
levels of subsidization. If they do not have an oﬀer of RHI, they may remain on their
former employer’s health insurance plan for 18 months following separation of employment
but they will pay the full cost of the insurance (plus a two percent administration fee).
This is commonly referred to as “COBRA” beneﬁts (after the federal Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 which granted this beneﬁt). The availability of EPHI and
RHI has declined in recent decades as fewer employers are oﬀering these beneﬁts to their
employees. According to a 2007 survey of employers, the percentage of employers oﬀering
EPHI is down from 69 percent in 2000 to 60 percent in 2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation
and Health Research and Education Trust 2007). Similarly, a larger study using Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) found that only one-quarter of private-sector employees
were working at ﬁrms that oﬀered retiree health beneﬁts in 2003 compared to 32 percent in
1997 (Buchmueller, Johnson and Lo Sasso 2006).
Private, non-group health insurance is one alternative to employer-provided health insur-
ance. It is hard to estimate the average cost of such plans because of the high variability in
the terms of each policy but they tend to be more expensive than employer-provided health
plans and have higher deductibles and co-payments for services. Until recently, insurance
companies in most states retained the option to deny coverage to individuals whom they
deem too risky or limit beneﬁts for pre-existing conditions. Examination of insurance com-
panies’ oﬀer rates have found that companies reject 10 to 14 percent of all applicants (Pauly
and Nichols 2002 Merlis 2005) and up to 37 percent of those with pre-existing conditions
(Pollitz, Sorian and Thomas 2001). The PPACA will address the problem of accessibility
6and limited coverage by prohibiting health insurance companies from using previous health
issues when evaluating an application and by standardizing coverage in the newly established
health insurance “Exchanges” (Democratic Policy Committee 2009).
If near-retirement aged individuals choose to go without insurance, they are facing higher
medical costs on average than younger Americans, with much higher variability. Tabulations
from the MEPS show the 2005 mean medical expenditure for individuals between 55 and 64
years of age to be over ﬁfty percent higher than for individuals between the ages of 45 and 54
at $5923 and $3775, respectively.8 Under the PPACA, those who choose to go uninsured may
also face a ﬁnancial penalty. The penalty for not maintaining “minimum essential coverage”
will start at $95 or one percent of income in 2014 and increase to $695 or 2.5 percent of
income in 2016 with cost of living adjustments made after 2016 though exceptions are made
for those who cannot aﬀord coverage (Democratic Policy Committee 2009).
3 Data, Deﬁnitions, and Descriptive Analysis
The analysis that follows uses detailed longitudinal data on a nationally representative sam-
ple of American households from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The initial cohort
of the HRS included households where at least one member was between the ages of 51 and
61 in 1992. A new cohort, labeled the War Baby Cohort, was added in 1998 and includes
households in which one spouse was between the ages of 51 and 56 at the time of their ﬁrst
interview.9 The HRS includes data from re-interviews that occur every two years, with the
most recent interview “wave” included in this study occurring in 2006. The data used in
this study is available from the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
and the RAND Center for the Study of Aging (see St. Clair (2008) for a description of the
RAND data ﬁles).
8This calculation is similar to an earlier calculation by Gruber and Madrian (1996). MEPS data is
available through the U.S. Department of Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/index.jsp.
9An additional retirement age cohort was added in 2004 to examine the patterns of baby-boomers but
there has not yet been enough data accumulated to include this cohort in the following analysis.
7The sample from the HRS used in the following analysis will be restricted in a number
of ways. There are 6,875 households represented in the HRS where at least one household
member is age eligible for one of the two cohorts identiﬁed above. Those households are
interviewed a total of 34,440 times. Table 1 itemizes the sample restrictions and the number
of households and observations that remain after each. The sample is limited to only married
couples in order to focus on the inter-dependence of health insurance. To focus on the act
of retirement, the sample is further limited to only households were the husband is working
and has not previously retired.10 The latter restriction is based on the concern that jobs
following a retirement reversal may not be similar to pre-retirement jobs and that those who
have retired previously might have unobserved diﬀerences from those who are considering
retirement for the ﬁrst time. Those who are self-employed are also excluded due to the
complicated relationship between beneﬁts and employment when one is running his own
business.
The ﬁnal general restriction on the sample is that one of the spouses in each household
must report health insurance from a current employer. This restriction is made in part
to address endogeneity concerns in regard to employees selecting into jobs that provide
health insurance due to a greater valuation of that beneﬁt. The selection concern will be
discussed further in Section 4 below. Ultimately, the analysis sample includes data from
3,044 independent households and 8,417 observations after a number of observations and
households are lost due to data availability.
Past literature has used varying deﬁnitions of retirement (see Karoly and Rogowski (1994)
for a discussion of various deﬁnitions). Following the methodology used in the RAND data
ﬁles and many other studies, I will deﬁne full and partial retirement based on the hours and
weeks worked by a respondent and their self-identiﬁed retirement status. Those who work
full-time (deﬁned as 35 hours or more per week and at least 36 weeks in the last year) will
not be considered retired regardless of their self-designation. Those working part-time will
10Re-entry is quite common as shown by Maestas (2010) and Congdon-Hohman (2006).
8be identiﬁed as partially retired if they self-identify as “retired” or simply part-time if they
do not. Finally, anyone not working and reporting being retired will be considered “fully
retired” while those not working and not identifying themselves as retired (the unemployed,
disabled, and those not in the labor force but not retired) will be excluded from the sample.
This study deﬁnes retirement as moving from a working, non-retired classiﬁcation (full-time
or part-time) to a retired labor force status (partial or full retirement).11
It is important to carefully categorize the health insurance circumstances of a couple and
how I deﬁne expectations for health insurance provision if the husband were to retire. Since
I am studying the link between health insurance and labor force transitions, it is important
to identify alternative sources of insurance that may not be linked to continued employment.
Aﬀordable alternatives to EPHI from the husband’s employer include RHI, Medicare, or
EPHI through a wife’s employer. Therefore, I will identify a husband as “at risk” of losing
his low-cost health insurance upon retirement if he reports that his employer oﬀers EPHI
but does not oﬀer RHI, his wife does not receive EPHI from her current or former employer,
and he will be under 65 as of the next wave. Similarly, I will identify a wife as “at risk” if
her current health insurance source is her husband’s employer, that employer does not oﬀer
RHI, and she will be under 65 years of age at the time of the next wave.12
Table 2 lists the qualiﬁcations one must have to be classiﬁed as “at risk” and the percent
of the examined sample that is potentially at risk based on each. Within the analysis sample
described above, the age qualiﬁcation only makes up a small part of the risk categorization
as most respondents in the analysis sample are under 65 years of age (91 percent of men
and 95 percent of women) and thus assumed to be ineligible for Medicare.13 Amongst the
11A weakness of this deﬁnition is that an individual working part-time can change their classiﬁcation to
partially retired without changing their work level since the diﬀerence between the two categories is purely
based on self-reported retirement status. The same is not true for a full-time worker since the deﬁnition does
not allow a full-time worker to be classiﬁed as retired. The results are generally similar to the ﬁndings below
using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of retirement such as considering only “full-time work” as a non-retired status or
full-retirement as the only retired status.
12The assumption that wives are eligible for RHI if the husband reports RHI is based on survey results
that ﬁnd this to be the case 91 percent of the time (Kaiser Family Foundation 2002).
13The use of 65 as the cutoﬀ for deﬁning risk is adjusted to incorporate the possibility that COBRA
continuation beneﬁts as an insurance bridge from the husband’s retirement to their 65th birthday and
9men, almost eighty percent identify their employer as their health insurance source with
thirty percent not being oﬀered retiree health coverage. Sixty-two percent of the men in the
analysis sample do not report a spouse having EPHI from her own employer and thus not
appearing to have her employer’s insurance as an alternative to his own employer’s (more on
this in a moment). Overall, 20.2 percent of the men in the analysis sample are identiﬁed as
at risk. The numbers are similar for women except that their risk is primarily determined by
whether they rely on their husband’s employer who oﬀers health insurance only to current
employees. About 21 percent of wives report health insurance through such a source and
the ﬁnal percentage of women deemed at risk is reduced slightly to about 20 percent when
the 65 years of age restriction is added.
One weakness of the HRS is that it does not ask respondents whether they have declined
EPHI from their employer. Therefore some individuals may be identiﬁed as “at risk” despite
the fact that their wives’ employers oﬀer EPHI to their employees if those oﬀers are not
accepted. These occurrences should be relatively rare as prior research by Buchmueller and
Valletta (1999) has shown that EPHI from a husband’s employer makes it signiﬁcantly less
likely that a wife will seek out employment with the same beneﬁt even when conditioning
on full-time employment. Regardless, these instances of misclassiﬁcation should bias our
results toward zero since individuals who are not truly at risk of losing their health insurance
upon retirement are classiﬁed as “at risk.” If a wife’s employer oﬀers EPHI, past economic
literature would suggest that a husband would be more likely to retire. Therefore, any
real negative impact on retirement rates due to the risk of losing health insurance will be
somewhat masked by those who are retiring at the same rate as those identiﬁed as “not at
risk” due to the unaccounted for alternatives.
Though husbands and wives have similar rates of being categorized as “at risk,” there
is some variation within the household. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the rates
that husbands and wives are identiﬁed as being “at risk.” Though each spouse has similar
Medicare eligibility in Appendix Section C.
10individual rates of risk (between 20 and 21 percent), the risk is only shared about 85 percent
of the time. The husband is alone at risk and the wife is alone at risk within in the household
in about three percent of the analysis sample each while 17.5 percent of the sample includes
households where both spouses are at risk. The second column focuses on the rates of
health insurance risk in the wave prior to a husband’s retirement. Comparing all waves
to only those immediately prior to a husband’s retirement, the share of households where
a husband is at risk diminishes more dramatically just before his retirement than do the
share of households where a wife is at risk. The ﬁnal column of Table 3 provides retirement
rates by risk categorization when returning to the full analysis sample. The fact that the
husband’s retirement rate is relatively similar in households where the husband alone or both
spouses may lose their health insurance if he retires but is much higher if only the wife is
at risk suggests that a wife’s health insurance circumstances have less inﬂuence than the
husband’s on the timing of a husband’s retirement and may be in the opposite direction. I
test in the analysis that follows whether this continues to be true when other demographic
and household characteristics are taken into account.
Table 4 examines the relationship of the health insurance risk identiﬁers to other measured
qualities. Though age is an important determinant of risk (since those over 65 years of age
are deﬁned to be not at risk due to their assumed eligibility for Medicaid), the table shows
that there is a good portion of the households where both spouses or the husband alone are
at risk up until the husband reaches age 65. It also shows that there are infrequent cases
(about 1.5 percent) where the wife is alone at risk until the husband reaches 65. The pattern
is similar as a wife ages but with more cases where the wife alone is at risk and fewer cases
where the husband alone is at risk until the wife reaches age 65. When looking at the wife’s
retirement status, Table 4 shows that a similar portion of the households in the sample have
both spouses at risk but more cases where just one spouse is at risk if she has already retired.
If the husband reports a pension, the household is more likely to have both spouses at risk
of losing their health insurance if the husband retires but less likely to have just one spouse
11at risk. In terms of non-housing wealth, the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution has
modestly more likelihood of all three risk categorizations but there is no clear pattern for
those in the second, third and fourth quartiles.14
4 Empirical Methodology
Like much of the literature referenced earlier, this paper focuses on reduced form analysis to
study the relationship of health insurance and retirement decisions. Though there is also a
large literature that employs a structural approach to similar questions, I have opted for the
reduced form approach primarily for its simplicity and clarity. Previous structural models
are extremely complex without introducing the wife’s insurance needs to the analysis. As
Kapur and Rogowski (2007) stated in their analysis of joint retirement, the interpretive
advantages of a reduced-form analysis outweigh the potential predictive gains available with
a structural model, which I believe is particularly true when looking at a complex question
like this one for the ﬁrst time.
Though health insurance oﬀers have been used extensively as an independent variable
in prominent economic studies of labor force decisions, there is a question as to the ap-
propriateness of using these oﬀers in reduced-form studies due to concerns over its possible
endogeneity. Speciﬁcally, endogeneity may be a concern if those with a preference for early
retirement select into jobs that oﬀer RHI. Additionally, RHI may be correlated with other,
unobserved qualities of a job. Recently, a number of researchers have rejected the endo-
geneity concern when conditioning on oﬀers of EPHI both on a practical basis and with
speciﬁcation checks. Kapur and Rogowski (2007) make three main arguments for not being
concerned about the possible endogeneity of retiree health insurance. First, Gustman and
Steinmeier (2001) and Schur, Berk, Wilensky and Gagnon (2004) provide evidence that in-
dividuals are not well informed about their retiree health beneﬁt packages, which suggests a
14A more traditional comparison of means between households where the husband is at risk and where he
is not at risk is available in Appendix Table 1.
12lack of planning for early retirement. Second, most employers require ten years or more of
tenure to qualify for RHI, which would require job changes prohibitively far in advance of an
expected retirement. Third, retirement planning is diﬃcult because retiree health insurance
has been scaled back dramatically in the last two decades and thus, there is no guarantee
that RHI will still be available when an individual retires. Unlike pensions which are insured
through the federal government, no legal requirement or guarantee exists to maintain retiree
health beneﬁts oﬀered before retirement. Additionally, Strumpf (2010) conducted a number
of speciﬁcation checks to support her use of RHI as an independent variable and found no
evidence that RHI was endogenous conditional on oﬀers of EPHI.15 To address these con-
cerns, I limit the sample studied to those households where at least one spouse receives EPHI
from a current employer and include a speciﬁcation using a number of job characteristics to
control for job quality.
In the section that follows, I present the results from three parallel probit analyses with
household-wave pairs as the observation level.16 In the baseline speciﬁcation (Speciﬁca-
tion 1), the only health insurance variable included is the husband’s risk of losing low-cost
coverage. With this speciﬁcation, households where only the wife is at risk of losing her
health insurance upon a husband’s retirement are included with the control group along
with households where neither spouse is at risk. This speciﬁcation is consistent with the
analyses done in previous research. The second speciﬁcation (Speciﬁcation 2) adds a control
for whether the wife alone is at risk of losing her health insurance. This speciﬁcation is
meant to address the question of whether households include the wife’s health insurance
circumstances when deciding on the timing of the husband’s retirement. Additionally, the
control group is more logically limited to only those households where neither spouse is at
risk of losing his or her health insurance if the husband retires. The third speciﬁcation (Spec-
iﬁcation 3) separately identiﬁes households where both spouses, only the husband, or only
the wife may lose their low-cost health insurance, which allows me to examine the relative
15Strumpf’s robustness checks included reanalysis on subsamples of those with over twelve years of tenure
and those over four years from retirement when ﬁrst observed.
16I cluster observations at the household level in order to report the correct standard errors.
13importance of each spouse’s risk. The following equations present the speciﬁcations more
formally:
P (HR|HIhusb) = Φ(α0 + α1HIhusb + α4X + α5W) (1)
P (HR|HIhusb,HIw only) = Φ(β0 + β1HIhusb + β2HIw only + β4X + β5W) (2)
P (HR|HIboth,HIh only,HIw only) = Φ(γ0 + γ1HIboth + γ2HIh only + γ3HIw only + γ4X + γ5W)
(3)
In these speciﬁcations, HR is an indicator for the husband’s retirement before the next wave,
HIhusb indicates whether the husband is “at risk” of losing his health insurance if he retires
before the next wave (regardless of his wife’s risk), HIh only and HIw only indicate that only
the husband or only the wife is at risk, and HIboth indicates both spouses are at risk. The
X variable represents additional factors that may be associated with a husband’s decision
to retire. Included in X are the wife’s retirement status, each spouse’s age, the household’s
non-housing wealth, and each spouse’s level of educational attainment. Additionally, X
includes indicators for whether the husband has a pension plan from his employer, whether
each spouse is between 62 and 64 years of age or age 65 and older, and whether each
spouse rates their health as poor or fair (on a ﬁve point scale).17 W represents a series of
dummy variables for each wave of the HRS and is included to capture any time trends in the
dependent variable.18 Additional speciﬁcations include other factors as control variables.
The results that follow are presented as mean marginal eﬀects (MMEs) rather than probit
coeﬃcients or marginal eﬀects at the mean. Mean marginal eﬀects are simply the average
of the calculated marginal eﬀects of a change in the variable of interest (from zero to one
if binary or a one unit change if continuous) for each individual in the sample if all other
covariates are as reported. By contrast, marginal eﬀects at the mean are the calculated
17Replacing the pension term with separate indicators for the type of pension plan (deﬁned contribution,
deﬁned beneﬁt, or both) results in slightly smaller estimates but do not change the ﬁndings. Those results
are shown in Appendix Table 5.
18The mean marginal eﬀects (MME’s) for the wave indicators from the probit analysis are omitted in
the tables below in order to save space. The MME’s of the wave dummies are generally not signiﬁcant at
traditional levels.
14marginal eﬀects if all covariates are evaluated at their mean value. The marginal eﬀects
at speciﬁc valuations of the key independent variables are also provided for comparison
purposes.
5 Estimation Results
Table 5 presents the results from the probit analyses outlined in the previous section.
Columns 1 through 3 present the mean marginal eﬀects (MMEs) when other covariates
(the above X’s) are excluded. The results in these columns reﬂect the surprising pattern
from Table 3 that the MMEs of both spouses being at risk and the husband alone being
at risk are of a similar magnitude, while the wife’s sole risk is associated with a signiﬁcant
increase in the retirement rate. Again, in order to be classiﬁed as “at risk” of losing health
insurance if the husband retires, a husband must report EPHI but not RHI, not have a wife
with EPHI from her own employer, and be under 65 years of age in the next wave. For wives
to be at risk, they must report their husbands’ employer as their source of EPHI with no
oﬀer of RHI and be under 65.
Column 4 through 6 of Table 5 duplicate the estimations presented in columns 1 through
3 with the addition of covariates. Column 4 (based on Speciﬁcation (1)) presents the results
if a wife’s health insurance risk is not explicitly considered. A husband’s “risk” of losing
aﬀordable health insurance if he retires is associated with a 6.6 percentage point decline in
the retirement rate, which is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Given that the sample
retirement rate is 16.6 percent, this implies a 40 percent drop. The seven percentage point
decline in husbands’ retirement rate if they stand to lose their health insurance is consistent
with previous estimates of the impact of retiree health insurance found in Madrian (1994)
(seven to 15 percent decline in likelihood of retiring before a man reaches 65), Karoly and
Rogowski (1994) (eight percentage point decline in retirement rate for men without RHI),
and Blau and Gilleskie (2006) (eight percentage point diﬀerence in labor force exit for men
15with and without RHI).
Column 5 of Table 5 presents the results for Speciﬁcation (2), which adds an indicator
for the wife only being at risk. Despite separating the households where the wife alone is at
risk of losing her health insurance from the comparison group, the MME of the husband’s
risk is left unchanged. The addition of covariates changes the MME of the wife’s exclusive
“risk” from positive to signiﬁcantly negative.19 These results suggest that a household does
consider a wife’s risk of losing her health insurance when choosing the timing of a husband’s
retirement, but that the segment of the population where the husband and the wife have
diﬀerent health insurance prospects is not currently large enough for its exclusion to have
an impact on estimations of the importance of health insurance when only the husband is
considered. As discussed earlier, the trend in RHI oﬀers may change this fact in the near
future.
To identify whether each spouse’s health insurance risk is equally weighted in household
decision making, I next separately identify households where only the husband is at risk
and both spouses are at risk (Speciﬁcation (3)). The results in column 6 of Table 5 show
the MME of all the risk indicators are negative and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
The indicator for the husband’s sole risk (a negative ten percentage point marginal eﬀect on
average) is about 60 percent larger than the MME for both at risk (negative six percentage
points). Despite the fact that the husband’s sole risk MME is almost twice that of the wife’s
(negative 5.2 percentage points), the hypothesis that the two MMEs are equal cannot be
rejected at the ten percent level based on the results of a Wald test.
The MMEs of the other covariates are generally as one would expect based on previous
literature. Table 5 shows that having a retired wife, a pension plan and each additional year
of age have a positive association with retirement and are signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Reaching the key ages of 62 (when he ﬁrst qualiﬁes for reduced Social Security beneﬁts) and
19The fact that the health insurance risk MMEs change when other factors are included may raise concerns
about the endogeneity of the health insurance indicators. Appendix Section B explores this question and
ﬁnds the addition of age to be the most signiﬁcant factor in the diﬀerences in the MMEs reported in Table 5.
1665 (when he becomes eligible for Medicare and unreduced Social Security beneﬁts) are also
associated with large increases in the retirement rate. Though mostly insigniﬁcant, a wife’s
age is also associated with an increase in the rate of retirement while key milestone ages of
62 and 65 for wives are negatively associated with a change in the husbands’ retirement rate.
If a husband reports his health as fair or poor, he is signiﬁcantly more likely to retire, but
not if the wife rates her health as fair or poor.
Though MMEs give an overview of the impact of each risk category by looking at the
average impact over the full sample, it is also interesting to look at the impact of each risk
category at various points in the sample. Table 6 presents the marginal eﬀects for the three
risk categories from Speciﬁcation (3) evaluated at various values of key covariates with other
covariates valued at their means. The ﬁrst panel examines the marginal eﬀects for diﬀerent
age pairings of the couple. At the mean values for those ages (59.4 is rounded to 59 for
husbands and 56.2 is rounded to 56 for wives), the marginal eﬀects are slightly lower than
the MMEs reported in Table 5, though all still signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. For each
spouse, the marginal eﬀects for all risk identiﬁers decrease as age increases by one standard
deviation but the scale of change is much smaller as the wife ages compared to the husband.
The marginal eﬀect for all risk identiﬁers decreases by over two percent with each standard
deviation change in the husband’s age but by only 0.2 percent for a similar change in the
wife’s age. When evaluating the marginal eﬀects of the risk identiﬁers at various levels of
other key controls, Table 6 shows that their negative impact is greater for those husbands
whose wives are retired, are not oﬀered a pension, and who report being in fair or poor
health. Changes to a wife’s health and the household’s non-housing wealth have little aﬀect
on the marginal eﬀect of the health insurance risk facing the households.
One reason for the large diﬀerence in the MMEs for a husband’s and wife’s sole health
insurance risk may be the diﬀerences in ﬁnancial costs of health care and insurance associated
with each gender. In the age range examined in this study, women tend to be healthier than
men and to have lower medical costs which result in lower non-group insurance premiums.
17If this diﬀerence is an important factor that has been missed in the above analysis, I would
expect that the marginal eﬀect of the risk of losing health insurance for women would be more
similar to that of men when diﬀerences in health are better controlled for. Table 7 presents
results when interacting the self-reported health measure with the health insurance risk
categories used above. The MME in column 1 are replicated from the original speciﬁcation
in Table 5. Column 2 presents the results when the health measures are interacted with the
appropriate health insurance risk indicator (e.g. the wife’s sole risk is interacted with the
wife’s health measure). The inclusion of interaction terms has very little impact on the health
insurance MMEs that involve the husband, but has a modest impact on the MME of the
“wife only at risk” category. The inclusion of interaction terms decreases the magnitude of
this MME by one percentage point and reduces the signiﬁcance below traditional thresholds
(from a signiﬁcance level of ﬁve percent to just above ten percent). The opposite is true of
the MMEs of the interaction terms.20 Though they are generally negative, only the MME
of the interaction term of the wife’s self-rated health and the wife only at risk identiﬁer is
signiﬁcant at traditional levels. This pattern seems to suggest that households are concerned
about the husband’s health insurance generally but consider the wife’s primarily when she
is in poor health. This pattern does not persist if other measures of health are used in place
of self-rated health quality measures (see Appendix Section D where the existence of health
conditions and hospital stays are substituted for self-rated health).
To examine the concern that health insurance may be acting as a proxy for job quality,
Table 8 presents the MMEs of a probit analysis when a large number of the husband’s job
characteristics are included. Speciﬁcally, I include a number of the husband’s reported job
requirements (the husband reports that his job “always” or “most of the time” includes
“physical eﬀort,” “good eyesight,” “intense concentration,” and “people skills”) and charac-
terizations of his job (the respondent “strongly agrees” or “agrees” that his job’s tasks are
“diﬃcult,” the job has “a lot of stress,” older workers feel “pressure to retire” or are given
20The MMEs and standard errors for interaction terms reported in Table 7 have been adjusted to reﬂect
the true magnitude of the interaction term’s marginal eﬀect described in Ai and Norton (2003).
18“less demanding tasks,” and whether he “enjoys” his work). The sample is limited to waves
3 through 8 due to the fact that questions about the enjoyment of work were not asked in
the second wave of the HRS. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show very little impact on the key
MMEs when the second wave is dropped from the sample used in the original speciﬁcation.
Columns 3 through 4 shows that though a number of job characteristics are associated with
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the retirement rate of husbands, their inclusion does not have a
marked eﬀect on the MMEs of the risk indicators. Thus, Table 8 is evidence that health
insurance risk is not acting as a proxy for job quality.
6 Conclusion
Economic literature focusing on the retirement of near-elderly men has largely omitted con-
trols for the health insurance implications of husbands’ retirements for their wives. The
results of this study suggest that households do consider the health insurance circumstances
of both spouses when choosing the timing of a husband’s retirement. I also ﬁnd that the
risk that a wife might lose the opportunity of low-cost health insurance has a similar impact
on husbands’ rate of retirement as the risk of a husband losing his own insurance, especially
once a wife’s health is thoroughly controlled for. In households where the wife is the only one
at risk of losing aﬀordable health insurance if the husband retires, the husband is 30 percent
less likely to retire than if neither spouse is at risk (a ﬁve percentage point decrease in the re-
tirement rate). These ﬁndings are similar to a previous ﬁnding that husbands are responsive
to their wives’ pension beneﬁts when making individual labor force decisions (Coile 2004).
The implications of these ﬁndings for the economic modeling of household decision making
is that both spouses’ ﬁnancial or health insurance circumstances must be considered in order
to correctly account for the incentives that each individual faces.
As a result of these ﬁndings, future policy analysis should take care to incorporate the
eﬀects for both an individual and his or her spouse when evaluating the impact of the
19reformed health insurance market and any possible changes to the Medicare program to
improve its ﬁnancial solvency. If the current trend of declining RHI oﬀer rates continues or
accelerates due to the passage of the PPACA, a failure to include the eﬀects of policy changes
on a spouse may underestimate the impact on men’s retirement rates. For example, new
regulations to make private, non-group health insurance more aﬀordable and accessible will
not only move forward the retirement of those who would have otherwise waited to become
eligible for Medicare, but also those who formerly appeared to be unresponsive to their own




Appendix Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of a husband’s labor-leisure optimiza-
tion problem when health insurance is tied to employment. For ease of analysis, I assume
the wife’s labor supply decision has already been made and the household is choosing the
husband’s labor supply to maximize its utility given the household budget constraint. One
could imagine that this is the result of a common preference approach to family behavior
(such as models based on Samuelson (1956) or Becker (1974)) in which an employment deci-
sion for the wife is made ﬁrst. Alternatively, the optimization problem presented here could
represent the decision faced by a husband in a Nash bargaining framework where each spouse
takes the other’s actions as given. This framework is common in much of the literature on
cooperative family bargaining models.21
In this example, households have some level of income not earned by the husband in the
current period (which may include income earned by the wife) and the value of any beneﬁts
not linked to on-going employment. Husbands can earn a constant wage for each hour of
leisure they relinquish for labor. Because EPHI is usually a beneﬁt oﬀered only to full-time
employees, the representation of the household’s budget constraint is discontinuous at the
point where the husband would be considered a full-time employee. The height of the kink
could be thought of as the cost of non-group health insurance, as the expected additional
medical costs to the household if not insured, or as the amount the household is willing to pay
to avoid the risk of extremely large medical costs due to a negative health shock.22 The solid
black line in Appendix Figure 2 represents the budget constraint for a household where both
21For a more detailed discussion of the models of household decision making, see Lundberg and Pollack
(1996).
22Though not represented in Appendix Figure 2, other beneﬁts (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) for full-
time workers would simply increase the size of the kink at full-time work while maintaining the less than
full-time representations of the possible budget constraints.
21spouses rely on the husband’s employer for EPHI. By this, I mean that if the husband were
not to work full-time, both the husband and the wife would be left with the choice between
only high-cost private, non-group health insurance or going uninsured (because they do not
have the options of Medicare, EPHI from the wife’s employer, or RHI from the husband’s
employer).
The size of the kink in the budget constraint depends on how many household members
are dependent on the husband’s EPHI. In couples where the husband has retiree health
insurance coverage, insurance through the wife’s employer, or both spouses are eligible for
Medicare, the budget constraint would be continuous because there is no added value of
working full-time other than additional wages. This scenario is represented in Appendix
Figure 2 as the fully linear budget constraint where the unearned income is the total of non-
current employment-based income and the value of health insurance for both spouses. The
budget line with a smaller discontinuity represents the case where only one spouse does not
have an alternative health insurance source (for example, when only one spouse is eligible
for Medicare). Prior research has excluded this case when examining the decision of men to
retire.
Based on the depiction in Appendix Figure 2, individuals will maximize their utility (U0
and U1 represent indiﬀerence curves where U1 > U0) by choosing full-time employment if
both spouses rely on the husband’s employer for health insurance. If the husband becomes
eligible for Medicare and the wife does not, the shape of an individual’s indiﬀerence curve
will determine whether the husband would maximize the household utility by continuing to
work full-time or by reducing his labor. As depicted in Appendix Figure 2, a husband who
becomes eligible for Medicare while his wife does not would still maximize the household’s
utility by working full-time. Models that do not include this intermediary case would predict
that the husband would reduce his labor and may construe the lack of that response as an
unresponsiveness to health insurance incentives.
22B Decomposition of the Impact of Covariates on Key
Mean Marginal Eﬀects
The fact that the health insurance risk MMEs change in Table 5 when other factors are
included may raise concerns about the endogeneity of the health insurance indicators. To
answer this concern, the lower panel of Appendix Table 3 shows the contribution of additional
covariate groupings using the values from analogously deﬁned ordinary least squares (OLS)
speciﬁcations. The upper panel of Appendix Table 3 presents the equivalent OLS results to
Table 5 and shows the OLS estimates to be very close to the MMEs from the probit analyses.
Using speciﬁcation (2) as an example, the values in the lower panel were arrived at through
the following series of equations:23
HR = aA
0 + aA
1 HIhusb + aA
2 HIw only + εA (4)
HR = aB
0 + aB
1 HIhusb + aB
2 HIw only + aB
3 X + εB (5)
x1 = b1 + bh
1HIhusb + bw
1 HIw only + ε1 (6)
x2 = b2 + bh
2HIhusb + bw
2 HIw only + ε2
. . .
xr = br + bh
rHIhusb + bw
r HIw only + εr
In the above equations, variables are labeled as in Section 4 where X = (x1,x2,...,xr) and
r is the number of additional covariates. Substituting equations (6) into equation (5) and


































23Though not included in the equations here, wave dummies continue to be included at every stage.






















Each term on the right hand side of Equation (8) can be interpreted as the individual impact
of the inclusion of that covariate on the change in the coeﬃcient of interest. For example, the









the m factors related to age.24 The bottom panel of Appendix Table 3 shows that almost all
of the change in the health insurance risk coeﬃcients is due to the inclusion of age variables
and not spouse’s retirement status, pension, wealth, health or education. If pensions or
education had been large contributors to the diﬀerence in the health insurance risk MMEs,
I would be concerned about other factors that this speciﬁcation is not accounting for that
may be associated with both the decision to retire and health insurance risk. The above
analysis does not imply that health, wealth, pensions and education are not associated with
a husband’s decision to retire, just that their inclusion does not have a major impact on the
coeﬃcients associated with health insurance risk.
C Incorporating COBRA into the Deﬁnition of Heath
Insurance Risk
One might also be concerned that employer continuation beneﬁts have not been included in
the deﬁnition of health insurance risk. Under federal law, employers with over 20 employees
are required to allow separated employees who have EPHI to remain in their current health
insurance plan, at 102 percent of the cost, for up to 18 months. This requirement is often re-
ferred to as COBRA beneﬁts, named after the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
24They are husband’s age, wife’s age, husband 65 or over, wife 65 or over, husband 62 to 64, and wife 62
to 64.
24Act of 1985. Forty of the ﬁfty U.S. states have enacted state laws amplifying COBRA by
lowering the employer size requirement.(Kaiser Family Foundation 2007) A few states have
extended the beneﬁts beyond 18 months for all employees in the state.25 Six states have
addressed the concerns of retirees speciﬁcally by requiring former employers of retirees who
are near Medicare eligible age to oﬀer continuation coverage until they reach the age of 65.26
Unfortunately, the unrestricted HRS data does not include information on the state that a
respondent lives in. The HRS does provide data on the region in which the respondents live,
but the states enacting additional continuation laws are not localized to any single region.
Generally, the take up rate for those who qualify for COBRA beneﬁts is relatively low, with
just over one in ﬁve exercising the option. (Flynn 1994)
Though there is not a direct question in the HRS that asks respondents if they are
taking advantage of COBRA to continue their beneﬁts, the deﬁnition of health insurance
risk can be modiﬁed to incorporate the possibility that COBRA beneﬁts play a signiﬁcant
role. Speciﬁcally, rather than deﬁning “at risk” as those who depend on EPHI without an
oﬀer of RHI and will still be under 65 years of age when next observed, I lower the cut-oﬀ
age by 18 months to 63 years, six months of age. After that age, a husband or wife could
use COBRA to extend health insurance beneﬁts to age 65 at which point he or she will
be eligible for Medicare. Columns 1 and 2 in Appendix Table 2 replicate the analysis of a
husband’s decision to retire using the modiﬁed deﬁnitions of risk for each spouse. Compared
to the original results in Table 5, the MMEs for most risk variables are only slightly diﬀerent.
Overall, the similar importance of husbands’ and wives’ risk in estimating the likelihood that
a husband retires remains true.
25CT, MA, NH, NJ, NY, TX, MN, ND, SD, CA, and NV extend health insurance beneﬁts to 36 months,
FL to 29 months, and IL to 24 months.
26They are IL, LA, MD, MO, NH, and OR.
25D Other Measures of Health
Appendix Table 4 examines the impact if self-rated health is replaced by two alternative
measures of health. In columns 1 and 2, self-rated health is replaced by an indicator for
the existence of a health condition. An individual is identiﬁed as having poor health if they
report ever having any of the following health conditions: diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart
problems, or a stroke. Almost one-quarter of the sample has one of these listed conditions
while only ten to 15 percent rate their health as fair or poor. Columns 3 and 4 present the
results if overnight hospital stays in the previous twelve months are used as an indicator
of poor health. Columns 1 and 3 show that the choice of health measures has very little
impact on the MMEs of the health insurance risk variables as the MMEs are similar to those
in Table 5. That said, the existence of a health condition for the wife has a signiﬁcantly
negative association with a husband’s decision to retire, while her self-rated health and a
hospital stay in the last year do not. When interaction terms are included in columns 2
and 4, their inclusion does not have the same impact as it did in the case of self-rated
health (Table 7).27 Unlike the speciﬁcation using self-rated health, the MME on the wife’s
sole risk identiﬁer remains signiﬁcantly negative and the interaction term does not have a
signiﬁcantly negative MME when either of the two alternative measures of health are used.
The diﬀerence in results here depending on which health proxy is used is not new to economic
literature. Bound (1991) discusses the variation in results when using self-reported health or
other health measures in retirement models but do not ﬁnd one measure to be better than
any other.
27As with the MME for the interaction terms in Table 7, adjustments have been made to reﬂect the true
magnitude of the interaction term’s marginal eﬀect as described in Ai and Norton (2003).
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29Table 1
Sample Restrictions
Number of Number of
Households Observations
General Restrictions:
Age eligible men or men with an age eligible spouse 6875 34440
Married currently and when last interviewed 6070 29220
Currently working and never retired 4388 14399
Not self-employed 3611 11110
Individual or spouse reports EPHI from his or her employer 3208 9618
Data Availability Restrictions:
Non-missing health insurance source information for husband 3166 9092
Non-missing health insurance source information for spouse 3084 8634
Detailed pension data available 3052 8442
No non-missing control variables and weights 3044 8417
30Table 2
Qualiﬁcations for “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance upon a Husband’s Retirement
Percent of
Analysis Sample
Qualiﬁcations for husband to be identiﬁed as “at risk”:
Husband is under 65 years of age 91.0%
Husband has EPHI from own employer 79.6%
Husband has EPHI from own employer but not oﬀered RHI 29.8%
Wife does not have EPHI from her own employer 62.2%
All of the above are true 20.2%
Qualiﬁcations for wife to be identiﬁed as “at risk”:
Wife is under 65 years of age 95.0%
Wife has EPHI from husband’s employer 55.7%
Wife has EPHI from husband’s employer but no oﬀer of RHI 21.3%
All of the above are true 20.3%
Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS age-
eligible, and at least one spouse with EPHI
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS household sampling weights.
31Table 3
Share “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance and Corresponding Retirement Rates
Categorization of the “Risk” of Share of Sample Share of Sample Retirement Rate
Losing Health Insurance in in Wave Prior in
if Husband Retires All Waves to Retirement All Waves
Neither spouse is at risk 76.9% 83.7% 18.0%
Husband is at risk 20.2% 12.1% 9.9%
Wife is at risk 20.3% 14.8% 12.1%
Both spouses are at risk 17.5% 10.6% 10.1%
Husband is at risk
2.8% 1.5% 9.1%
but not the wife
Wife is at risk
2.9% 4.2% 24.2% but not the husband
Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS age-eligible,
and at least one spouse with EPHI
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS household sampling weights.
32Table 4
Risk Categorization by Characteristic Values
Percent of “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance:
Full Sample Both Spouses Only Husband Only Wife
Husband’s Age
Under 59 58.8% 20.1% 2.7% 1.5%
60-61 15.9% 18.6% 3.5% 1.4%
62-64 16.4% 16.3% 4.0% 1.4%
65+ 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.8%
Wife’s Age
Under 59 76.2% 19.1% 2.1% 2.1%
60-61 10.0% 17.3% 2.1% 3.7%
62-64 8.8% 13.3% 1.9% 10.0%
65+ 5.0% 0.0% 16.5% 0.0%
Spouse is Retired
Yes 11.1% 17.3% 9.1% 4.9%
No 88.9% 17.5% 2.0% 2.6%
Pension
Yes 81.2% 18.6% 2.3% 2.6%
No 18.8% 12.6% 4.9% 4.2%
Wealth
Bottom 10% 10.0% 23.0% 5.5% 3.4%
Bottom 25% 25.0% 19.5% 5.0% 3.2%
2nd Quartile 25.0% 16.3% 2.3% 2.6%
3rd Quartile 25.0% 16.6% 2.0% 3.0%
Top 25% 25.0% 17.4% 1.8% 2.7%
Top 10% 10.0% 17.7% 2.3% 3.0%
Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS age-
eligible, and at least one spouse with EPHI
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS household sampling weights.
33Table 5
The Mean Marginal Eﬀects (MMEs) of Both Spouses’ Health Insurance Risk on Husbands’
Retirements
1 2 3 4 5 6
Husband’s Fully Husband’s Fully
Husband’s Risk and Exclusive Husband’s Risk and Exclusive
Risk Only Wife’s Non- Risk Risk Only Wife’s Non- Risk
shared Risk Categories shared Risk Categories
Husband “at risk” of losing health -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.066*** -0.066***
insurance if he retires [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011]
Both “at risk” of losing health -0.079*** -0.061***
insurance if husband retires [0.010] [0.012]
Only husband “at risk” of losing -0.090*** -0.101***
health insurance if he retires [0.018] [0.021]
Only wife “at risk” of losing 0.051* 0.051* -0.053** -0.052**
health insurance if husband retires [0.028] [0.028] [0.022] [0.022]
Wife is retired 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.072***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Husband has a pension plan (DB, 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037***
DC, or both) [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Husband’s age in years at next 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
wave (NW) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Wife’s age in years at NW 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Husband will be between 62 & 64 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.134***
years old at NW [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Wife will be between 62 & 64 years -0.009 -0.007 -0.007
old at NW [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Husband will be 65 years old or 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.073***
older at NW [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
Wife will 65 years old or older -0.027 -0.033* -0.028
at NW [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
Husband’s self-rated health 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
is fair/poor [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Wife’s self-rated health is fair/poor 0.003 0.002 0.004
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Real total non-housing -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
assets (in 100k’s) [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Husband’s educational attainment -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
is less than high school diploma [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Husband’s educational attainment -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
is some college but no degree [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Husband’s educational attainment -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
is college degree or more [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Wife’s educational attainment is -0.007 -0.006 -0.005
less than high school diploma [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Wife’s educational attainment is -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
some college but no degree [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Wife’s educational attainment is -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
college degree or more [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Observations 8417 8417 8417 8417 8417 8417
Standard errors in brackets, clustered by Household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies are included in all speciﬁcations.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband is not self-employed,
and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS.
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The Marginal Eﬀect of Health Insurance Risk Evaluated at Diﬀerent Covariate Values
“At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance:
Both Spouses Husband Only Wife Only
Marginal SE Marginal SE Marginal SE
Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect
Husband’s Age/Wife’s Age
At ages 55/50 -0.036*** [0.007] -0.052*** [0.010] -0.029** [0.011]
At ages 55/56 -0.038*** [0.008] -0.055*** [0.010] -0.030** [0.012]
At ages 55/62 -0.040*** [0.008] -0.059*** [0.011] -0.032** [0.013]
At ages 59/50 -0.054*** [0.011] -0.080*** [0.015] -0.043** [0.018]
At ages 59/56 (mean) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.085*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
At ages 59/62 -0.059*** [0.012] -0.089*** [0.017] -0.047** [0.019]
At ages 64/50 -0.078*** [0.017] -0.123*** [0.026] -0.063** [0.027]
At ages 64/56 -0.080*** [0.017] -0.128*** [0.026] -0.065** [0.028]
At ages 64/62 -0.083*** [0.018] -0.132*** [0.028] -0.067** [0.029]
Wife’s Retired?
No -0.054*** [0.011] -0.081*** [0.015] -0.043** [0.018]
Yes -0.073*** [0.015] -0.114*** [0.024] -0.059** [0.025]
Husband has a pension?
No -0.047*** [0.010] -0.070*** [0.014] -0.038** [0.015]
Yes -0.058*** [0.012] -0.088*** [0.016] -0.047** [0.019]
Couple’s Self-Rated Health
Both “Good,” “Very Good,”
-0.054*** [0.011] -0.082*** [0.015] -0.043** [0.018]
or “Excellent”
Husband only “Fair” or “Poor” -0.069*** [0.015] -0.107*** [0.022] -0.056** [0.023]
Wife only “Fair” or “Poor” -0.055*** [0.012] -0.083*** [0.017] -0.044** [0.018]
Both “Fair” or “Poor” -0.070*** [0.015] -0.109*** [0.023] -0.057** [0.024]
Non-Housing Wealth
in 2000 Dollars
$5,513 (10th Percentile) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.085*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
$22,825 (25th Percentile) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.085*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
$70,129 (50th Percentile) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.085*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
$203,982 (75th Percentile) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.085*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
$449,518 (90th Percentile) -0.056*** [0.011] -0.084*** [0.016] -0.045** [0.018]
Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. All marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
of covariates unless otherwise speciﬁed.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Both “At Risk” of Losing Health -0.061*** -0.058***
Insurance if Husband Retires [0.012] [0.015]
Only Husband “At Risk” of Losing Health -0.101*** -0.102***
Insurance if He Retires [0.021] [0.023]
Only Wife “At Risk” of Losing Health -0.052** -0.04
Insurance if Husband Retires [0.022] [0.025]
Husband’s Health Measure Poor
0.056*** 0.056***
[0.016] [0.017]
Wife’s Health Measure Poor
0.004 0.01
[0.014] [0.016]
Interaction of Husband having a Poor Self-rated -0.009
Health with Joint Health Insurance Risk [0.040]
Interaction of Wife having a Poor Self-rated -0.020
Health with Joint Health Insurance Risk [0.031]
Interaction of Husband’s Poor Self-rated Health -0.024
with Husband Only Health Insurance Risk [0.055]
Interaction of Wife’s Poor Self-rated Health -0.078**
with Wife Only Health Insurance Risk [0.040]
Additional Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 8417 8417
Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by Household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Note 1: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband
has a pension, household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, and education level.
Note 2: MMEs for interaction terms have been adjust based on Ai and Norton (2003).
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired,
husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort
of the HRS
36Table 8
Additional Speciﬁcations Examining Husbands’ Retirements with Job Characteristics
1 2 3 4
Original Speciﬁcation Including Job
Waves 3 through 8 Characteristics
Means Husband’s Fully Husband’s Fully
Wave 3 Risk and Exclusive Risk and Exclusive
through Wife’s Non- Risk Wife’s Non- Risk
Wave 8 shared Risk Categories shared Risk Categories
Husband “at risk” of losing health 0.215 -0.072*** -0.070***
insurance if he retires [0.013] [0.013]
Both “at risk” of losing health
0.184
-0.066*** -0.064***
insurance if husband retires [0.014] [0.014]
Only husband “at risk” of losing 0.031 -0.106*** -0.101***
health insurance if he retires [0.023] [0.023]
Only wife “at risk” of losing health 0.032 -0.054** -0.053** -0.052** -0.051**
insurance if husband retires [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Job Requirement: “Physical eﬀort” 0.288 -0.008 -0.008
all or most of the time [0.013] [0.013]
Job Req.: “Good eyesight” 0.807 -0.02 -0.02
all or most of the time [0.018] [0.018]
Job Req.: “Intense concentration”
0.788
-0.014 -0.014
all or most of the time [0.017] [0.017]
Job Req.: “People skills” 0.797 -0.008 -0.008
all or most of the time [0.015] [0.015]
Job Condition: Strongly agree or agree 0.505 0.014 0.013
that tasks are more diﬃcult than before [0.012] [0.012]
Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree 0.580 0 0
that job has a lot of stress [0.012] [0.012]
Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree that 0.154 0.069*** 0.069***
older workers feel pressure to retire [0.017] [0.017]
Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree that
0.315
-0.028** -0.027**
older workers given less demanding tasks [0.012] [0.012]
Job Req.: At least one value 0.759 0.018 0.02
missing in HRS [0.046] [0.046]
Job Cond.: At least one value 0.080 -0.079*** -0.080***
missing in HRS [0.029] [0.029]
Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree 0.095 -0.077*** -0.077***
that “enjoy” work [0.016] [0.016]
Job Cond.: Enjoy work 0.100 -0.032 -0.032
missing in HRS [0.024] [0.024]
Additional Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6661 6661 6661 6661 6661
Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by Household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note: “Enjoy job” is only available in waves 3 through 8. Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies
are included in all speciﬁcations. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a pension,
household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education level.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband is not self-employed,
and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
37Appendix Figure 1
Distribution of the Age Gap between Spouses in a Household
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39Appendix Table 1
Comparing Characteristics of Those “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance at a Husband’s
Retirement and Those Not “At Risk”
Mean if Mean if Probability
Husband Is Husband Is Means Are
“At Risk” Not “At Risk” Equal
Wife Is Working 53.0% 71.3% 0.00
Wife Is Retired 31.9% 53.7% 0.00
Wife Is Working Full-time 15.2% 11.7% 0.00
Husband’s Age 56.31 57.55 0.00
Husband Is Over 65 0.0% 5.7% 0.00
Husband Is between 62 and 64 5.8% 13.6% 0.00
Wife’s Age 53.96 54.19 0.16
Wife Is Over 65 3.3% 2.3% 0.01
Wife Is between 62 and 64 4.0% 6.7% 0.00
Husband’s Self-rated Health Is Fair or Poor 14.1% 11.7% 0.01
Husband Reports a Health Condition 24.8% 26.2% 0.27
Husband Had a Hospital Stay in the Last Year 12.9% 13.9% 0.32
Wife’s Self-rated Health is Fair or Poor 21.6% 14.0% 0.00
Wife Reports a Health Condition 27.3% 24.0% 0.01
Wife Had a Hospital Stay in the Last Year 16.9% 13.7% 0.00
Husband Reports Any Pension 81.1% 79.2% 0.10
Husband Reports a Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) Pension 43.1% 48.5% 0.00
Husband Reports a Deﬁned Contribution (DC) Pension 46.9% 40.1% 0.00
Husband Reports Both Types of Pensions 18.1% 18.8% 0.52
Household Non-Housing Wealth in Millions (2000 Dollars) 0.162 0.200 0.14
Husband’s Education: Less than High School Diploma 17.2% 16.6% 0.56
Husband’s Education: High School Diploma 38.2% 34.7% 0.01
Husband’s Education: Less than College Degree 18.2% 20.6% 0.03
Husband’s Education: College Degree 26.2% 27.8% 0.21
Wife’s Education: Less than High School Diploma 19.8% 14.2% 0.00
Wife’s Education: High School Diploma 34.8% 33.4% 0.31
Wife’s Education: Less than College Degree 24.1% 24.2% 0.98
Wife’s Education: College Degree 15.9% 20.3% 0.00
Number of Household-Wave Observations 1529 6888
Note: Probabilities represent the results from a simple t-test.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband is not self-
employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
40Appendix Table 2
Analysis Using Deﬁnitions of Health Insurance Risk that Incorporate Possibility of COBRA
1 2
Husband’s Risk Fully
and Wife’s Exclusive Risk
Means Non-shared Categories
Risk using using Maximum
Max Age 63.5 Age 63.5
Husband “at risk” of losing health
0.188
-0.065***
insurance if he retires [0.012]
Both “at risk” of losing health
0.161
-0.063***
insurance if husband retires [0.013]
Only husband “at risk” of losing
0.027
-0.083***
health insurance if he retires [0.024]
Only wife “at risk” of losing health
0.033
-0.053** -0.053**
insurance if husband retires [0.020] [0.020]
Additional Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 8417 8417 8417
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies are included in all
speciﬁcations. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a
pension, household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education
level.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired,
husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the
HRS
41Appendix Table 3
Decomposition of Changes to Health Insur-
ance Risk Probit MME’s when Adding Additional Covariates Using Ordinary Least Squares
A: Analogous Analysis Using Ordinary Least Squares
1 2 3 4
Husband’s Risk and Fully Exclusive Risk
Wife’s Non-shared Categories
Risk
Husband “At Risk” of Losing Health -0.082 -0.058
Insurance if He Retires [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Both “At Risk” of Losing Health -0.080 -0.053
Insurance if Husband Retires [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Only Husband “At Risk” of Losing -0.094 -0.097
Health Insurance if He Retires [0.019]*** [0.021]***
Only Wife “At Risk” of Losing 0.052 -0.054 0.052 -0.053
Health Insurance if Husband Retires [0.029]* [0.027]** [0.029]* [0.027]**
Additional Covariates No Yes No Yes
Observations 8417 8417 8417 8417
B: Net Contribution of Covariate Groupings to the Diﬀerence in OLS Coeﬃcients
1 2 3 4 5
Husband’s Risk and
Wife’s Non-shared Fully Exclusive Risk Categories
Risk
Husband Wife Only Both at Husband Wife Only
at Risk at Risk Risk Only at at Risk
Risk
Diﬀerence in OLS Coeﬃcient -0.024 0.107 -0.028 0.002 0.106
Age Variables -0.031 0.100 -0.033 -0.016 0.098
Spouse Retired 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.019 0.006
Pension & Wealth 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.003
Health 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
Husband’s Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wife’s Education 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Diﬀerence in Probit MME -0.021 0.104 -0.018 0.011 0.103
Notes: “Age Variables” include husband’s and wife’s raw age, whether 65 or over, and whether be-
tween 62 and 65. “Pension and Wealth” includes whether husband has any pension and household’s
non-housing wealth. “Health” includes husband’s and wife’s self-rated health. “Education” includes
categorical values of “Less than High School,” “Some College,” and “College Degree” for each spouse.
42Appendix Table 4
Analysis of Husbands’ Retirements with Interactions of Other Health Measures




Both “at risk” of losing health -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.059***
insurance if husband retires [0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.015]
Only husband “at risk” of losing health -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.096*** -0.087***
insurance if he retires [0.021] [0.025] [0.021] [0.023]
Only wife “at risk” of losing health -0.052** -0.048* -0.050** -0.049**
insurance if husband retires [0.022] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024]
Husband’s health measure poor
0.034*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.049***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.015] [0.016]
Wife’s health measure poor
-0.029*** -0.031*** -0.011 -0.017
[0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
Interaction of husband’s poor health -0.016 -0.043
measure with joint HI risk [0.027] [0.033]
Interaction of wife’s poor health 0.027 0.039
measure with joint HI risk [0.027] [0.034]
Interaction of husband’s poor health -0.00645 -0.105***
measure with husband only HI risk [0.048] [0.042]
Interaction of wife’s poor health -0.011 -0.005
measure with wife only HI risk [0.038] [0.050]
Additional Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8397 8397 8414 8414
Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by Household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%
Note 1: Health conditions include ever having diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart problems, or a
stroke. Wave dummies included in all speciﬁcations.
Note 2: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies included in all speci-
ﬁcations. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a pension,
household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, and education level.
Note 3: MMEs for interaction terms have been adjust based on Ai and Norton (2003).
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Husband “at risk” of losing health -0.060***
insurance if he retires [0.012]
Both “at risk” of losing health -0.056***
insurance if husband retires [0.013]
Only husband “at risk” of losing -0.089***
health insurance if he retires [0.022]
Only wife “at risk” of losing -0.048** -0.047**
health insurance if husband retires [0.022] [0.022]
Husband reports both a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) 0.051*** 0.050***
and deﬁned contribution (DC) pension [0.016] [0.016]
Husband reports only a DB pension
0.085*** 0.084***
[0.015] [0.015]
Husband reports only a DC pension
-0.024* -0.024*
[0.013] [0.013]
Additional Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 8417 8417
Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note 1: Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, household wealth,
and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education level. Wave
dummies are included in all speciﬁcations.
Note 2: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights.
Sample: Husband or Wife had EPHI in the previous wave, Husband has not previously
retired, Husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War
Baby cohort of the HRS
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